Camouflaging in autism as a dual-normative construct: a philosophical critique

AI Summary

Ontologically, camouflaging lacks stability, failing to delineate a coherent class of behaviours distinct from adjacent social adaptations.
Epistemologically, research methods are theory-laden and circular, presupposing the very phenomena they purport to measure.
Logically and ethically, the concept embeds contradictions and a dual normative framework that pathologises deviation while privileging narrow autistic legibility.

Theor Med Bioeth. 2026 Jun 23. doi: 10.1007/s11017-026-09763-4. Online ahead of print.

ABSTRACT

Social camouflaging-broadly defined as the suppression or modulation of autistic traits to conform to dominant ableist social norms-has become a dominant construct in autism research. Yet despite its empirical and cultural prominence, the concept has not undergone sustained philosophical scrutiny. This paper develops a fourfold critique. Ontologically, camouflaging lacks stability, as it fails to identify a coherent class of phenomena distinguishable from adjacent behaviours. Epistemologically, it relies on theory-laden and circular methodologies that presuppose what they purport to measure. Logically, it embeds contradictions, particularly in attributing intentional capacities to subjects diagnosed in part on the basis of impaired social reasoning. Ethically, it operates within a dual-normative framework that pathologises deviation while privileging narrow forms of autistic legibility. We argue that deconstructing camouflaging exposes its fragility and raises fundamental questions about the normative commitments underlying psychiatric classification.

PMID:42334760 | DOI:10.1007/s11017-026-09763-4

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